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Preface 
The research project on Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic Dynamics at  IIASA is 
concerned with modeling technological and organisational change; the broader economic devel- 
opments that  are associated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes 
by which economic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the capabilities 
to  generate, imitate and adopt technological and organisational innovations; and the aggregate 
dynamics - at  the levels of single industries and whole economies - engendered by the interac- 
tions among agents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and 
expectations. The central purpose is to  develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. 
However, the basic philosophy is that such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when 
attention is paid to  the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims t o  address: 
therefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts' concern- 
ing corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 'demography' of 
firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on 
various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential 
and difference equations, and some of it stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken 
advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional 
mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and 
economic dynamics is significantly richer than it was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
the similarities and differences of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables that lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition t o  empirical work a t  the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a 
great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance a t  the 
level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts that  
seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations, with the 
dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income, with the 
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that  successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought t o  address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical work 
has often been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that  needed t o  be explained. 
The list of these 'facts' is indeed very long, ranging from the microeconomic evidence concerning 
for example dynamic increasing returns in learning activities or the persistence of particular sets 
of problem-solving routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and 
size-distributions - approximately log-normal - all the way t o  the evidence regarding the time- 
series properties of major economic aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical 
work and the empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project 
is that  the chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques can 
be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment where scholars who understand 
the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant t o  pursue an 'evolutionary' interpretation of technological 
and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and organisa- 
tions learn, search, adapt; second, the economic analogues of 'natural selection' by which inter- 
active environments - often markets - winnow out a population whose members have different 
attributes and behavioural traits; and, third, the collective emergence of statistical patterns, 
regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently a t  IIASA, the project coordinates 
multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises workshops 
and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, 
computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. 
The research focuses upon the following three major areas: 
1. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
2. Technological and Industrial Dynamics 
3. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics 
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Abstract 
This paper' attempts to present a theory of economic growth. In Section I it discusses the 
experience of growth modelling over the past 40 years and argues that it fails to capture the 
most important features of institutional and technical change. Nevertheless as a method for 
ordering concepts it can be a usehl complement to historical research. The problem with 
history is the almost infinite multitude of events, which have to be classified, described and 
analysed. A simplifying theoretical framework is essential and inevitable. 
Section I1 tentatively presents such a simplifying classificatory framework. It argues that five 
historical processes or sub-systems of society have been shown by historical research to be 
relatively autonomous although interacting major influences on the process of economic 
growth. These five overlapping sub-systems are science, technology, economy, politics and 
general culture. Each of these is briefly defined. Humans share with other animals the natural 
environment which can also powedully and reciprocally influence economic growth. The 
other five historical processes each have their own partly autonomous "selection environment" 
and are uniquely human, which is one reason why biological evolutionary analogies have 
limited value. Although each of the five has its own distinctive features and relative 
autonomy, it is their interdependence and interaction which provides major insights into the 
processes of "forging ahead", "catching up" and "falling behind" in economic growth. Positive 
congruence and interaction between them provides the most fertile soil for growth, while lack 
of congruence may prevent growth altogether, or slow it down. 
Although a satisfactory theory of economic growth should help us to understand the evolution 
of the world economy much better, the limits of forecasting and prediction in the social 
sciences should be clearly recognised. Popper was surely right in maintaining that the most 
important historical changes are qualitative and non-repetitive. The fact that we can predict 
eclipses does not mean that we can predict revolutions. Section 111 discusses the problem of 
non-recurrence for the social sciences. 
Section IV takes a major example to illustrate the theory which has been tentatively advanced 
- the archetypal example of forging ahead in the British Industrial Revolution in the late 18th 
Century. It briefly discusses a dozen or so major features of this revolution as identified by 
historians and suggests that together they justify the notions of confluence and congruence 
between science, technology, economy, politics and culture as a plausible explanation of the 
leap ahead in economic growth then achieved for the first time in world history. 
Section V then discusses British "falling behind" in the late 19th Century and 20th Century and 
suggests that this can probably be explained in terms of loss of congruence between the five 
sub-systems of British society. The rise of new increasingly science-based technologies and of 
specialised professional management in large corporations fitted ill with some of the older now 
"traditional" British political and social institutions. 
After a brief discussion of the more deliberate processes of "catching up" the paper concludes 
by pointing out that the theory put forward here resembles many earlier explanations of 
economic growth. Marx's materialist conception of history stressed the tensions between 
The inordnate length is due to the fact that, if it sunlives at all, it is destined to become two or three rclatcd 
papers, or possibly a couple of chapters in a book. 
"forces of production", "relations of production" and "superstructure" as a source of social 
and political change or of stagnation in economic growth. Many other historians and 
economists (e.g. Veblen, Mokyr, von Tunzelmann, Galbraith, Perez) have stressed in 
particular the inter-action between technical change and organisational change within firms, as 
well as political and institutional change at other levels in society. This paper differs from 
most of them and from Marx's theory in two respects. First, it attaches greater importance to 
science and to general culture. In this it resembles the theories of Needham and Bernal. 
Secondly, it does not attempt to assign primacy in causal relationships to any one of the five 
spheres, whereas most other theories assign primacy to technology or the economy or both. It 
emphasises rather the relative autonomy of each of the five spheres, based on the division of 
labour and each with its own selection environment. It is this co-evolution which generates 
the possibility of mis-match between them and periodically of radical institutional innovations 
which attempt to restore harmonious development. Such harmony however is not necessarily 
favourable to economic growth, which is not the only objective pursued by human beings. 
"Congruence" which is favourable to economic growth must be distinguished from other types 
of congruence. 
Acknowledgements 
I am grateful to Keith Pavitt, Martin Bell and William Walker for helpful comments. 
I am particularly gratekl to Nick von Tunzelmann for much helpful advice and information as 
well as comments and for the inspiration from his pioneering work on "Industrialisation" 
(1995) and his earlier work on the Industrial Revolution (1978). 
Finally, I am indebted to Carlota Perez for innumerable comments, criticisms and ideas. 
Most of all I want to thank Susan Lees for her extraordinarily patient and competent 
assistance in producing this draft. 
HISTORY, C'O-EVOLUTION AND ECONOMIC' GROWTH 
1. Introduction : The Contemporary "Methodenstreit" and the Early Growth Models 
A century ago, the German economics profession was split into warring camps in the so-called 
"Methodenstreit" over the role of history in economics. The historical school led by Gustav 
Schmoller stressed the uniqueness of human evolution, the difficulty of making broad 
generalisations and the need to study the specific national and local characteristics of each 
developing society. The neo-classical school, led by the Austrian Carl Menger, emphasised 
the necessity to make generalisations based on logical deduction and abstract models which 
could be tested with empirical data. Schumpeter's attitude to this debate was somewhat 
equivocal, reflecting his life-long inability to cut the Walrasian umbilical cord and at the same 
time his recognition of the crucial importance and complexity of evolutionary change. On the 
whole, he sided with the neo-classical school (Louqa, 1995) although in later life he was to 
emphasise very strongly the necessity to study the history of technical change, the detailed 
story of individual companies and of the major business cycles (Schumpeter, 1939, 1942) and 
to recommend to the consternation of his Harvard colleagues that economics should be a post- 
graduate subject only, for those who had first studied history and mathematics. 
The "Met/~otle/atreitl' ended in almost total victory for the neo-classicals and not only in 
Germany and Austria but world-wide. However, seen in the longer-term, this has proved to 
be a pyrrhic victory. Although often marginalised within the mainstream of professional 
economics, those who stressed the need for an historical approach, the recognition of 
qualitative change, of institutional diversity and of path dependence for firms, industries, 
national economies and technologies continued stubbornly to challenge the prevailing 
orthodoxy. Now, at long last their prolonged efforts are meeting with some success as can 
easily be seen from any major literature review (Dosi, 1988; Freeman, 1994), as well as from 
some acknowledgement by leading neo-classical theorists themselves (Hahn, 1987, 199 1; 
Arrow, 1994) of hndamental problems with the mainstream models. Hahn even speaks of 
the subject returning to its Marshallian evolutionary affinity and facing "the uncertain embrace 
of history and sociology and biology." (Hodgson, 1995). 
As Sidney Winter (1986) remarked it seems so obvious to us "Heracliteans" that you cannot 
bathe in the same river twice and that evolutionary change is ubiquitous, that we are 
constantly amazed that our colleagues apparently continue to neglect it. There are, however, 
genuine intellectual arguments which prevent many economists from accepting the full 
implications of the evolutionary or institutional critique of mainstream economics. First and 
foremost among these arguments is the belief that evolutionary theories do not yet offer a 
satisfactory alternative because of their inability to make useful generalisations. The neo- 
classical model, with all its faults, is simply retained as an admittedly very crude approximation 
to real world behaviour, or as an abstract ideal yardstick by which to judge policies and reduce 
"imperfections". 
A similar dilemma confronted economic historians in the 1950s and 1960s when they faced the 
question of the role of economic theory in the explanation of economic growth, defined here 
as the growth of output. As Supple (1963) pointed out, many historians complained that 
much of theoretical economics was "too remote and artificial to be of much use in the study of 
economic society in the past: that on the whole, its hypotheses and its analytical concepts 
were abstractions which bore little resemblance to the real world", or were "too restricted in 
scope to be used in historical investigations without distorting facts to fit them into 
preconceived theoretical models". 
Theorists however were not slow to respond that historians were often mere antiquarians, 
"gatherers of miscellaneous facts for their own sake" and that they were "too preoccupied 
with the apparent uniqueness of events" and with case histories to develop systematic 
explanations. Only with an appropriate theoretical framework would economic history cease 
to be a collection of unconnected stories and an "interesting but largely useless hobby". 
(Supple, 1963, page 17). 
Supple argues that the truth does not lie midway between these two opposing points of view 
or with either one but that both are right. It is a question ofgood economic theory and good 
history. Bad theory can indeed be too remote from reality to be of any use or, worse still, can 
be positively misleading. Good history must aspire to be more than a mass of undifferentiated 
data. 
The theory of economic growth is obviously an area where, as in the Methoder~streit, the 
historical and the abstract theoretical approaches are most likely to clash and where the need 
for "good" theory and "good" history is most apparent. The tensions inherent in the dialogue 
between economists and economic historians and the difficulties of resolving these tensions 
are indeed well illustrated by the development of growth models and growth theories in the 
second half of this century. Following the Methou'er~streit mainstream economics paid little 
attention to growth theory in the first half of the century* but in the 1950s and 1960s it 
became a fashionable topic. The first Harrod-Domar growth models (Harrod, 1939, 1948; 
Domar, 1946, 1957) had attempted to demonstrate the (rather narrow) conditions for a 
dynamically stable full employment growth path in the Keynesian tradition. The later models, 
following Solow's (1957) pioneering contribution were mainly based on neo-classical 
assumptions and put the main stress on capital accumulation and increases in the supply of 
labour, which could be roughly quantified for long periods in the leading industrial countries. 
All other influences on the rate of growth were subsumed in a so-called "Third Factor" or 
"Residual Factor" in the aggregate production function. 
The growth modellers did not claim that their models provided a satisfactory representation of 
the complexities of institutional and technical change. Thus, for example, Frank Hahn (1987) 
was quite explicit: 
Supple even maintains that there was hardly any fresh systematic discussion of the nature of economic 
development after 1850, with the exception of M a n  (Supple, 1963. p. 14). 
"Neo-classical growth theory is not a theory of history. In a sense it is not 
even a theory of growth. Its aim is to supply an element in an eventual 
understanding of certain important elements in growth and to provide a way of 
organising one's thoughts on these matters." 
(page 625) 
The treatment of all the complexities of technical and institutional change in early growth 
models came in for heavy criticism both fiom historians and fiom many economists, especially 
as most of the models showed that the "Third Factor" apparently accounted fdr most of the 
growth. Balogh (1963) dubbed the "Third Factor" the "Coefficient of Ignorance" while 
Supple (1963) concluded that "it must surely be clear that any discussion of the relationship 
between capital formation and economic growth necessarily entails the appraisal of a host of 
other issues. And these in their turn lead to the conclusion that the accumulation of capital is 
in itself by no means the central aspect of the process of economic growth" (Supple, 1963, p. 
22). 
In response to this criticism various attempts were made to disaggregate the residual factor in 
the aggreate production function, notably by Denison (1962, 1967), who used what Dosi 
(1988) described as an "entire Kama-Sutra of variables" in his efforts to make systematic 
comparisons of growth rates. Yet none of these efforts could survive the trenchant criticism 
of Nelson (198 1) and others who pointed to the conlplmtentnrity of all these variables. The 
contribution of capital accumulation to growth depends not only on its quantity but on its 
qllalig, on the direction of investment, on the skills of entrepreneurs and the labour force in 
the exploitation of new investment, on the presence (or absence) of social overhead capital 
and so forth. 
A brave and highly original contribution to the growth modelling debate came fiom Irma 
Adelman (1963). She recognised early on that the assumption of constant returns to scale in 
many models raised big problems and in the so-called "New Growth Theory" this assumption 
has been dropped in favour of Allyn Young's (1928) increasing returns to scale (Romer, 1986; 
Grossman and Helpman, 199 1). 
These models usually also follow her in attempting to assign a specific role to technical change 
(or as she termed it "the stock of knowledge from applied science and technology"). In her 
model Irma Adelman also separated "Natural Resources" from other forms of capital in much 
the same way as the classical economists separated land. This distinctjon is likely to become 
increasingly important with the growing recognition of the importance of ecological factors 
and resource conservation in economic growth. She also separated technical change from 
other forms of institutional change. Thus she specified the production fbnction as: 
where Kt denotes the amount of the services of the capital stock at time t 
Nt stands for the rate of use of natural resources 
Lt represents the employment of the labour force 
St represents "society's fbnd of applied knowledge" 
Ut represents the "social-cultural milieu within which the economy operates " 
(Adelman, 1963, page 9) 
Adelman was also unusual in her frank recognition of the immense difficulties in the 
production fbnction approach and of the interdependence of her variables. For example, 
"....... both the quality and the composition of the labour force vary through 
time and are not independent of the rates of change of the other variables in the 
system. Specifically, changes in the skills and health of the labour force are 
directly dependent upon changes in society's applied fbnd of technical 
knowledge (St)" 
Like other modellers, she suggests that the conceptual problems "which arise from the 
heterogeneity and incommensurability of the production factors may be reduced somewhat if 
we think of each input as a multi-component vector rather than as a single number". 
However this is still not the greatest difficulty with the production fbnction approach. Again, 
as Irma Adelman so clearly points out: 
"Even more difficult than the measurement problems raised by these 
production factors are those posed by an attempt to quantifL our last two 
variables. St and Ut represent heuristic devices introduced primarily for 
conceptual purposes .... . At some time in the future a method may be evolved 
for the ordinal evaluation of St and Ut but such a method does not now exist 
and accordingly neither variable can be used as an analytical tool." 
(pages 1 1-1 2) 
This situation has scarcely changed since 1963 despite some advances in the measurement of 
R&D and of education and despite the somewhat greater realism about technical and 
institutional change in the more recent "new" growth models (Verspagen, 1992). 
All of this does not mean that the modelling attempts and developments in growth theory of 
the past half century have been a complete waste of effort. Adelman's argument for the 
heuristic value of growth modelling still stands and her own attempt to use her production 
function to illustrate the differences and similarities in the growth theories respectively of 
Adam Smith, Ricardo, Marx, Schumpeter, Hanod, Kaldor and the neo-Keynesians is an 
excellent example of these heuristic advantages. But when all is said and done the main 
conclusion of the whole debate has been to vindicate the contention of many economic 
historians and neo-Schumpeterian economists that technical change and institutional change 
are the key variables to study in the explanation of economic growth. 
In his fairly sympathetic treatment of neo-classical growth theory Gomulka (1 990) concluded 
that: 
"The cumulative effect of the theoretical and empirical work has been to 
highlight more sharply and widely than ever before how really central is the 
role, in long-term economic growth, of the activities producing qualitative 
change in the economy. Technological changes have assumed the primary role 
by virtue of their being typically the original impulses which tend to initiate 
other qualitative changes. By the same token, the work has also helped to 
delineate the very limited usefulness of the (standard) growth theory based on 
the assumption that these qualitative changes are cost fiee and exogenously 
given. " (page 19) 
These conclusions are of course wholly unsurprising to neo-Schumpeterian economists and to 
those economic historians such as Landes (1 965, 1969), Rosenberg (1 974, 1976, 1982), 
Rosenberg and Birdze11(1986), Hobsbawm (1 968, 1979, David (1975, 199 I), Abramovitz 
(1979, 1986) or von Tunzelmann (1995) who have upheld this interpretation of the historical 
evidence. The general vindication of their standpoint and indeed its partial recognition in the 
"new growth theory" can be taken as hrther supporting evidence for the neo-Schumpeterians 
in their contemporary "Methodenstreit" with the neo-classicals. 
Moreover, even though the work of Abramovitz (1986) on "Forging Ahead", "Catching Up", 
and Falling Behind" is in many respects more illuminating than the early neo-classical models 
as a tentative explanation of differences in growth rates over the past two centuries, it is 
nevertheless vulnerable to the pointed critique of Jang-Sup Shin (1995) and others who have 
criticized the notion of "social capability" as too vague to be operational for development 
policy-making. The neo-Schumpeterian notion of "technological capability" is no less 
vulnerable to this type of critique. No-one can really doubt the universal validity of these 
concepts but partly because they are so universal, they do not tell us very much. 
Neo-Schumpeterians may well respond that they have attempted to develop such ideas as the 
"national systems of innovation" (Nelson, 1993; Lundvall, 1992) precisely in order to inject 
greater empirical and theoretical content into the notions of "social" and/or "technological" 
capability. Although the work on national systems of innovation (Ckmbridge Jorrn~al of 
Eco~tontics, 1995) has done something to put flesh and bones on the basic ideas of "social" 
and "technological" capability, it is by no means yet enough to satisfy the critics, who are 
increasingly uneasy about the neo-classical edifice but do not yet find acceptable the 
evolutionary alternative. This paper therefore makes a first tentative effort to develop a 
theoretical framework for "reasoned history" and growth economics. It is experimental rather 
than definitive and is intended to stimulate critical debate. It attempts to build on the 
pioneering study of industrialisation by von Tunzelmann (1995). 
11. A Theoretical Framework for Reasoned History 
A theoretical framework for the history of economic growth should satisijl four main 
requirements. First, it should provide a plausible explanation and illumination of the stylised 
facts which summarise the main features of the growth of the world economy, especially for 
the last two centuries but ideally for a much longer period. Secondly, it should do this for the 
three main categories identified by Abramovitz (1986): forging ahead, catching up and falling 
behind. Thirdly, it should identiijl the major recurrent phenomena in each category to pave 
the way for generalisations, which should of course be constantly tested against new historical 
evidence, as well as newly unfolding events. Finally, it should provide a framework for 
analysing and reconciling the research data, case studies and generalisations emerging from the 
various sub-disciplines of history: the history of science and of technology, economic history, 
political history and cultural history. 
As a first step in an inevitably ambitious and hazardous undertaking, the following definitions 
are tentatively proposed for the subject matter which is of interest and from which the 
evidence is drawn for explanations of economic growth. 
1. The histoty of sciettce is the history of those institutions and sub-systems of society which 
are primarily concerned with the advancement of knowledge about the natural world and 
the ideas of those individuals (whether working in specialised institutions or not) whose 
activity is directed towards this objective. 
2. The hisloty of lechttolo~ is the history of artefacts and techniques and of the activities of 
those individuals, groups, institutions and sub-systems of society which are primarily 
concerned with their design, development and improvement, and with the recording and 
dissemination of the knowledge used for these activities. 
3 .  Ecottomic histoty is the history of those institutions and sub-systems of society which are 
primarily concerned with the production, distribution and consumption of goods and 
services and of those individuals and institutions concerned with the organisation of these 
activities. 
4 .  Politicnl history is the history of those individuals, institutions and sub-systems of society 
which are primarily concerned with the governance (legal and political regulation by 
central, local or international authorities) of society, including its military affairs. 
5. Cultrrral history is the history of those ideas, values, artistic creations, traditions, religions 
and customs which influence the behavioural norms of society and of those individuals and 
institutions which promote them. 
Finally, human beings share with other animals the ~mtrlml e~l~iroi~met~t  and this too has its 
own history and largely independent evolution. Although this is not usually studied by 
historians but is left to geologists, ecologists, astronomers, meteorologists, physicists and 
others, it is nevertheless an important influence on human history and is certainly reciprocally 
influenced by industrialisation and economic growth. Moreover, it is now possible that 
ecological factors may predominate in determining the rate and direction of economic growth 
during the course of the 21st Century. However, in view of the special factors involved in this 
discussion, this aspect of economic growth is not firther developed here. A return to the 
classical tradition of taking "land" seriously is long overdue but for reasons of space it is not 
tackled here. The present discussion is confined to the five spheres which have been defined 
above. 
This paper will now attempt to just@ the use of these five sub-divisions for conceptual and 
analytical purposes whilst accepting of course that people make only one history and 
recognising that in real life the five streams intermingle. The same people can be active in 
several or even all of the five spheres. However the use of sub-divisions is tlot simply a matter 
of convenience in handling an extremely complicated topic nor is it just a question of 
following the academic departmentalisation and specialisations which have emerged in the 
20th Century. These two factors do play some part and the academic specialisation does 
provide some indication of the importance of the independent consideration of each sphere. 
Moreover, the establishment of separate sub-disciplines reflects the sense of dissatisfaction felt 
especially by scientists, technologists and economists that their special interests were being 
neglected within the wider rubric in which they were contained. "History" was often felt to be 
mainly the story of Kings, Queens, Emperors, Empresses, Presidents, Constitutions, 
Parliaments, Generals, Ministers and other agents of the state (ie. "political history" in terms of 
the above definitions) or at most political and cultural history. The Editor of the 
"Encyclopaedia of the History of Technology" was not alone in protesting at the neglect of 
technology in this approach (McNeil, 1990). 
However, these five sub-divisions are proposed here for far more fundamental reasons. In the 
first place, they are proposed because each one has been shown to have some independent 
influence on the process of economic growth, varying to be sure in different periods and 
different parts of the world, but at least sometimes extending over long periods. Finally, and 
most important of all, it is precisely the relatise autonomy of each of these five processes 
which can give rise to problems of lack of synchronicity and harmony or alternatively of 
harmonious integration and virtuous circle effects on economic growth. It is thus essential to 
study both the relatively independent development of each stream of history and their 
interdependencies, their loss of integration and their reintegration. 
The study of "out of synch" phenomena and of the positive or negative interaction between 
our five different streams is essential for the understanding of Abramovitz's (1979, 1994) 
distinction between "potential" for growth and realised growth as it is too for Leibenstein's 
(1957) "Xu inefficiency. We shall now briefly attempt to justifL the separate treatment of 
each one of the five sub-divisions which have been defined and then discuss in Section I11 
some problems of recurrent phenomena and of the social sciences in general, so that the 
inherent limitations of all historical studies are recognised. - 
Anyone who has debated with historians of science brought up in the Lakatos tradition must 
have been impressed by their strong attachment to the "internalist" view of their subject and 
their resistance to "externalist" ideas about the influence of the economy or of political events 
on the development of science. For them the "selective environment" which operates for 
novel scientific hypotheses and theorems consists purely of the criteria and methods of the 
scientific community itself. 
Popper's emphasis on deduction and his narrow rejection of the role of it~duction in the history 
of science is highly questionable but, whether or not we accept Popperian criteria for the test 
and survival of scientific ideas and theories, we cannot fail to recognise that the partly 
autonomous selective environment of the scientific community is a vital element in the history 
of science. 
Similarly, with the history of technology studies of the evolution of the ship, of the hammer, of 
flints for tools and weapons, of the harnessing of the horse, and of the steam engine or the 
plough emphasise alike the relative autonomy of the improvements which were made over the 
centuries to these artefacts, so essential for human civilisation. The selective environment 
which interests, inspires and constrains engineers, designers, inventors and mechanics and 
many historians of technology is primarily the techtlicrrl environment, the criteria of technical 
efficiency and reliability and of compatibility with existing or future conceivable technology 
systems. 
The reciprocal influence of science and technology upon each other has been demonstrated in 
numerous studies and is indeed obvious in such fields as computer technology and 
biotechnology today as well as in earlier developments such as thermo-dynamics and the steam 
engine. Technology has to take account of the laws of nature and hence of science. 
Nevertheless, Derek Price (1 984), Rosenberg (1 969, 1974, 1976, 1982), Pavitt (1 995) and 
many others have produced cogent arguments for recognising the special features of each sub- 
system precisely in order to understand the nature of their interaction. Nor does this refer 
only to recent history as the massive contributions of Needham (1954) to the history of 
Chinese science and technology clearly illustrate. 
Historians of technology such as Gille (1978), and Hughes (1982) have amply demonstrated 
the qstemic nature of technologies and analysed the interdependencies between different 
elements in technology systems. Both they and Rosenberg (1969, 1982) have also shown that 
the technological imperatives derived from these systemic features may serve as focussing 
devices for new inventive efforts. Such efforts are of course also often powerfully influenced 
by economic advantages and rewards. Finally, in their seminal paper "In Search of Useful 
Theory of Innovation" Nelson and Winter (1977) drew attention to the role of technological 
trajectories both specific to particular products or industries and general trajectories, such as 
electrification or mechanisation affecting a vast number of processes and industries. These 
ideas were further developed by Dosi (1982) in his work on technological trajectories and 
technological paradigms, in which he pointed to the relative autonomy of some patterns of 
technological development by analogy with Kuhn's paradigms in science. Despite the obvious 
close interdependence between technology and the economy or technology and science, it is 
essential to take into account these relatively autonomous features in the history of 
technology. 
A satisfactory theory of economic growth and development must certainly take account of 
these reciprocal interdependencies but it should also recognise that the relative autonomy of 
evolutionary developments in science and technology justifies some independent 
consideration. In terms of models, there is a strong justification for the procedures adopted by 
Irma Adelman in separating St from Ut and perhaps going even hrther and separating St 
(science) from Tt (technology). 
An essentially similar argument applies to economic change. No-one can seriously doubt the 
importance of capital accumulation, profits, changes in company organisation, the behaviour 
of firms and of banks for the evolution of industrial societies over the past two centuries. 
Economic institutions too have some relative autonomy in the cycles of their development. 
We may fully accept Supple's critique of the treatment of capital accumulation in growth 
models but still pay attention to such variables as the share of investment in GDP, business 
cycles, the trend of the capitaMabour ratio, the capitaVoutput ratio and so forth. This also 
applies to the growth of the labour force, levels of employment and demographic trends, the 
availability of land and natural resources, although all of these are also influenced by cultural 
and political trends as well as by technology. Explanations of economic growth must pay 
especially close attention to the interdependencies between economic history and 
technological history. It is precisely the need to understand the changing nature of this 
interdependency which leads us to study "out of synch" phases of development, when, for 
example, changes in technology may outstrip the institutional forms of the production and 
market system, which may be slow to change or impervious to change for relatively long 
periods. The reverse may also occur providing impetus to new technological developments, 
as with the assembly line or factory production. 
Finally, some of these out-of-phase synchronicity problems may be on such a scale that they 
affect the entire yoliticnl and legal organisation of society. An obvious example was the 
institution of serfdom in Mediaeval Europe. Most historians and economists would argue that 
mobility of labour was one of the essential pre-conditions for the emergence of capitalist 
industry. It would appear on almost all lists of "stylised facts" about the Industrial Revolution. 
In his six "major characteristics" of modem economic growth Simon Kuznets (1971) points to 
the rapid shift from agricultural to non-agricultural occupations and most historians agree that 
the exceptionally early relaxation of the obligations of serfdom in Mediaeval Britain was one 
of the main factors contributing to Britain's later "forging ahead" in the Industrial Revolution. 
By the same token the tightening up of the "Second Serfdom" in Eastern Europe and other 
institutional constraints on the mobility of labour are often advanced as one of the main 
reasons for the retarded economic growth in Russia and some other East European countries 
(Dobb, 1947), although there is continuing debate on the sequence of events which led to this 
retardation. 
Further back in history and on a much longer time scale, the influence of slavery on 
technological and economic development in Ancient Greece and Rome and the more complex 
problems of Chinese government and cultural institutions and their effects on science and 
technological development and diffusion of innovations have all been the subject of major 
historical investigations. The influence of the political and legal system and of the general 
culture on the economy and on technology was clearly a major factor in all these cases and 
once more it is essential to recognise that the political system and the general culture did not 
necessarily change to accommodate new advances in science and technology or in the 
economy, but had their own dynamic and relative independence (See, for example, Madison, 
1995). 
The restrictive regulation of trade and industry by the state, by Mediaeval Guilds and by local 
authorities was held by Adam Smith, as well as by Marx, to be a major hindrance to capitalist 
growth. Today also the mode of regulation of various industries is often raised as a factor of 
retardation or acceleration of their growth, notably in the case of telecommu~cations. The 
tensions between major changes in technology system, the organisation of firms and political 
institutions are at the heart of Carlota Perez' (1983) highly original theory of structural 
changes and long waves in capitalist development. 
Finally, crrlf~rrnl change is generally accepted as an important influence on economic growth. 
At the most elementary level, literacy and the quality of general education (as well as purely 
technical education) are assigned a crucial role in much of the "new growth theory" and in the 
World Bank (1992) Development Report. Over the longer term the classic work of Max 
Weber (1930) and RH Tawney (1926) on "Religion and the Rise of Capitalism", although still 
controversial (see Kitch, 1967), demonstrated that a change in attitudes towards usury, the 
rate of interest, work, consumption and accumulation was important for the rise of acquisitive 
entrepreneurial behaviour in Mediaeval Europe. Some Marxist historians might be inclined to 
treat religious activities as part of the ideological "superstructure" of society, but the relative 
autonomy of many religious orders and traditions, as well as the conflicts between Church and 
State, and the role of religion in establishing cultural norms, mean that it cannot be regarded 
simply as a part of the political system. Nor can politics be denied some independent role, as 
indeed Engels (1 890) himself recognised. 
"Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fact that younger writers 
sometimes lay more stress on the economic side than is due to it. We had to 
emphasise this main principle in opposition to our adversaries who denied it 
and we had not always the time, the place or the opportunity to allow the other 
elements involved in the interaction to come into their rights." 
(page 477) 
In his historical studies Marx did indeed discuss with great subtlety and irony the role of 
political parties and cultural institutions as well as the history of technology and the economy. 
His materialist conception of history was based on the view that autonomous development of 
the "productive forces" brought them into conflict with the "relations of production" leading 
periodically to the revolutionary reconstitution of society and the emergence of new political 
institutions and a new "superstructure". Clearly there are important points of resemblance as 
well as difference between the Marxist scheme and that which is proposed here. It tries to 
avoid some of the rigidities and classification problems of the Marxist scheme whilst 
recognising his major original contribution to historiography. 
This Section has attempted to outline a theoretical framework for the study of economic 
growth and to provide tentative definitions of five historical processes which are believed to 
be of the greatest importance for the explanation and understanding of growth. It suggests 
that each one of these should be studied, both in its own autonomous development within each 
society and in its reciprocal interactions with the other elements, with a view to identifying and 
analysing retardation or acceleration phenomena. However, an historical approach to 
economic growth is unlikely to be acceptable unless it not only tells a story using this type of 
theoretical framework but is capable of identifying and explaining recurre~it phenomena, as 
well as special cases. As Werner Sombart (1929) put it: 
". . . . . all history and particularly economic history has to deal not only or mainly 
with the special case, but with events and situations which recur, and, 
recumng, exhibit some similarity of feature - instances which can be grouped 
together, given a collective label and treated as a whole." 
(Sombart, 1929, page 18) 
It is to the question of recurrent phenomena and their interpretation in the natural and social 
sciences that we turn in the third section of this paper. 
111. Recurrent Phenomena in the Social and Natural Sciences 
However much we might agree with Sombart about the need to identi@ recurrent phenomena 
and make testable generalisations, there are nevertheless genuine difficulties in achieving this 
aim in the social sciences. Whereas in many of the natural sciences it is possible not only to 
make repeated observations of natural phenomena but to do so under controlled conditions, 
often in a laboratory, this is much harder in most of the social sciences and in relation to a 
theory of history, generally the only recourse is to (often not very reliable) historical records. 
It is true that in his "Poverty of Historicism", Karl Popper (1957) upbraided the social sciences 
for what he maintained was their over emphasis on the differences between the natural and 
social sciences and gave as one example, the supposed difficulty of conducting experiments in 
the social sciences. He pointed out that this was even harder for astronomers and geologists 
than for economists or sociologists. In his view there was far more scope for experimental 
techniques in the social sciences than was generally imagined. Moreover, generalisations in 
the social sciences need not be based on ideological preconceptions or political bias, but could 
be derived, as in the natural sciences, from hypotheses and conjectures which could be tested 
for "falsifiability". Statements which could not be tested in this way, whether in the natural or 
the social sciences, were not, in Popper's view scientific statements. "Social engineering", he 
contended, was also possible in the social sciences, just as applied technology and engineering 
provided practical tests for theory in the physical sciences. 
It may well be that in economics, sociology and psychology, there is more scope for 
experimental testing and for "social engineering" than is often realised. An example in the 
sphere of economics is the measurement of elasticity of demand for both new and old products 
by varying price syste~natically between different regions of a country. Market research firms 
do in fact sometimes use this type of data with the cooperation of their clients and more 
systematic controlled experiments would be possible, given the cooperation of enterprises and 
ideally also of the media. Stretching imagination to the limits it is possible to envisage some 
governments with greater power and greater commitment to social science research than any 
at present visible, conducting large scale experiments with taxes, interest rates and other 
economic incentives. However, the international complications and the political process 
within countries would place severe limits on the feasibility and duration of any such 
experiments. It is hardly conceivable that the process of economic growth itself could be the 
subject of controlled experiment and comparative study. The longer the time period, the 
harder it is to imagine the use of such methods. This is no substitute for history. 
Even on the relatively short time-scale of the Juglar cycle it has proved extremely difficult to 
develop econometric models or forecasting methods which are able to take account of 
institutional or technical change. This does not mean that this modelling work has not yielded 
valuable results. On the contrary, as in the case of long-run models of economic growth, 
much has been learnt from this experience. Up to a point models can provide an alternative to 
controlled experiments both in the natural and the social sciences. 
Model-building is indeed one way of testing theories of growth retrospectively with historical 
empirical data. Even though it has been argued that aggregate prod~~ctioi~.fimctioii models 
did not provide a very satisfactory test for theory, something was learned fiom this experience 
and as Nelson and Winter (1974) proposed in their discussion of neo-classical versus 
evolutionary theories of growth, it would be possible to build a whole family of models to test 
evollrtiorlary explanations (page 894). It was their pioneering achievement (1982) to build the 
first nlathenlatical model of this kind and to show that it provided a possible explanation of the 
long run growth of the American economy with far more plausible assumptions about 
technical change and firm behaviour than the neo-classical assumptions embodied in the 
aggregate production fknction models. 
This does not mean of course that one has to agree with all the assumptions in the Nelson and 
Winter model, such as on the role of adversity in the innovative behaviour of firms. Clearly, 
firms do sometimes innovate both when they are expanding fast as well as where they grow 
slowly or are even contracting (Gomulka, 1990, p. 77). The value of model-building is 
precisely to provide a framework for testing alternative explanations and debating alternative 
assumptions. 
However, even though, whether by modelling or other methods, we may achieve a 
considerable improvement in our understanding of economic growth, this does not mean that 
this will permit yrediclit~e forecasting in the way that prediction is possible in some of the 
natural sciences. The ubiquity of qualitative change, the uncertainty inherent in the growth of 
science and technology, as well as political and cultural change, rule this out. Indeed, no-one 
insisted on this more strongly than Popper (1963) himself ' 
"Society is changing, developing. This development is not in the main 
repetitive. True in so far as it is repetitive, we may perhaps make certain 
prophecies. For example, there is undoubtedly some repetitiveness in the 
manner in which new religions arise, or new tyrannies; and a student of history 
may find that he can foresee such developments to a limited degree by 
comparing them with earlier instances, i.e. by studying the conditions under 
which they arise. But this application of the method of conditional prediction 
does not take us very far. For the most striking aspects of historical 
development are non-repetitive. Conditions are changing, and situations arise 
(for example, in consequence of new scientific discoveries) which are very 
different from anything that ever happened before. The fact that we can 
predict eclipses does not, therefore, provide a valid reason for expecting that 
we can predict revolutions." 
(Popper, 1963, page 341) 
Even though we may rate the recurrence of repetitive events as rather more common than 
Popper allows, it is hard to refute his fundamental point. A theory of history must start from a 
realistic recognition of the limited role of historical recurrence. This does not mean however 
that we cannot learn a great deal from even this limited recurrence as well as from unique 
events. Both meteorology and seismology are natural sciences which have difficulty with 
long-term prediction but provide probabilistic forecasts useful for policy-making. In fact, 
since the entire universe is evolving, even those long-term predictions in which we have great 
confidence, such as the date of the next eclipse are really no more than conditional 
probabilistic forecasts with a very high degree of probability attached. 
It is in this context that Sidney Winter's recollection of the Heraclitean standpoint that "we 
cannot bathe in the same river twice" is so thought-provoking. There is no doubt that 
Heraclites (and Sidney Winter) were right that whatever river we may choose to bathe in 
tomorrow, it will not be the same as the one we bathed in yesterday or today, even though it 
may have the same name and look the same to all outward appearance. This is also true of the 
entire physical universe. It is indeed evolving all the time and no part of it is exactly the same 
today as it was yesterday. Nevertheless there are sufficient relatively stable characteristics of 
most rivers for a sufficiently long time (centuries if not millennia) that we can use the 
knowledge of these characteristics and of recurrent patterns of change to navigate some and 
to use them or others for irrigation. Useful generalisations can be made about rivers even 
though they will certainly not be valid for all time. For example, one of the earliest great 
human civilisations was based on such scientific observations and identification of recurrent 
patterns in the behaviour of the Nile and the use of this knowledge for large-scale irrigation of 
agriculture. Models can be made of the silting of estuaries or of the influence of rainfall on the 
rate of flow, which may be useful both for the advance of science and for technology. Of 
course, it would be foolish to ignore processes of change, such as erosion or pollution, which 
may affect the behaviour of those who might wish to drink the water or bathe in it but the 
regularity of recurrence has been sufficient for many practical human purposes. 
Thus, despite the validity of Heraclites' statement we can nevertheless agree with Popper that 
we can make limited conditional generalisations both about the recurrent behaviour of rivers, 
as well as the human institutions which can make use of this knowledge, although the latter 
statement is subject to greater qualifications. The questions for historical research are: how 
much similarity persists and over what periods, what brings an end to the identifiable recurrent 
patterns and how do new patterns emerge? 
These are indeed the questions which have preoccupied economists in the study of business 
cycles, whether these are inventory cycles (Kitchin cycles), the (now "traditional") business 
cycles (Juglars) or long (Kondratieff and Kuznets) cycles. Analysis of economic growth must 
certainly be concerned with cyclical behaviour, whether in modem capitalist economies or 
older civilisations. Although there have been many irregularities in these cycles there has also 
been sufficient recurrence, at least in recent times, as to provide some usefkl indications for 
generalisation and for policy-making. The work of Carlota Perez (1983, 1985, 1988) on long 
cycles has shown that even if ideilfical behaviour is ruled out, as it must be, there may still be 
striking (or hidden) similarities or dissimilarities, which are helpfkl in understanding the 
phenomena and even in making probabilistic forecasts and indications for policy. The 
comparative method of establishing differences, as well as similarities, can be especially 
helpfil, as was demonstrated on a small scale in Project SAPPHO in relation to innovation 
performance in firms. Plant breeders who study the growth of plants make widespread and 
very effective use of this method of paired comparison. 
The study of recurrent events is likely to be most hithl when it is possible to identifjl 
instances of rlor~-recnrrerlce, (or rlorl-hnpperlir~g) in certain countries or over certain periods, 
as well as instances of recurrence but with some varying characteristics. Why does a river 
sometimes stop flowing, whether seasonally (the Winterbourne phenomenon) or for longer 
periods? Why do some rivers change their course or become more polluted than others? Why 
do industries grow fast in some countries but not in others? Why do some countries catch up 
rapidly at some periods and others more slowly or not at all? These are the kind of questions 
which may yield benefits from comparative studies of recurrence even though we cannot bathe 
in the same river twice and even though history is a unique series of events. 
It will be argued in Section V that Gerschenkron (1962, 1963, 1968) in particular proposed an 
interesting technique for the study of recurrent phenomena in the "catch-up" process of 
various countries. Far more difficult is the case of "forging ahead" because by definition this 
implies the emergence of many new features in the world economy. But before turning to the 
consideration of catching up and forging ahead in economic growth we first conclude the 
discussion of method in the natural and social sciences. 
We may concede to Popper that the differences between natural and social sciences can easily 
be exaggerated and that the social sciences have much to learn from the successes of the 
natural sciences. It is tempting for social scientists, in their anxiety to obtain results 
comparable to the more spectacular achievements of their colleagues, to try and imitate their 
methods and make analogies with one or other of the natural sciences in developing their own 
models and theories. In particular, it is tempting for evolutionary economists, as the very 
name implies to make analogies with biological evolution in their efforts to break away from 
mechanistic models. (For a recent selection of papers in this tradition, see Hodgson, 1995). 
Such analogies can provide valuable insights and the use of metaphor and analogy generally is 
often helpful in stimulating imaginative thinking and breaking the "mind-forged manacles" (to 
use a poet's metaphor) of obsolete theories and behaviour. The biological analogy 
concentrates attention on the process of change and on the interaction between organisms and 
their environment in selecting certain types of change. This focus is certainly helpful in the 
study of economic growth but as with all analogies, it is essential to recognise its limitations as 
well as its validity. One of the main differences between biological evolution and the process 
of economic growth is that there are several different selection environments in the evolution 
of human social systems. The natural environment is common to both but that is where the 
similarity ends. As we have argued in Section I, it is essential to understand the distinct 
human selection environment within various sub-systems as for example, the science sub- 
system. The accumulation of scientific knowledge and of technological knowledge and 
artefacts are uniquely human processes even though they may have originated, as with other 
animals, in the search for food and shelter and the communication associated with this search. 
In the case of technology too, there are birds and mammals which do make use of "tools" in 
the sense of twigs, branches or stones, but the systematic desigrl and inproventent of tools 
and other artefacts are also uniquely purposeful human activities, with their own partly 
autonomous selection environment. Economists often use a biological analogy to analyse the 
competitive behaviour of firms in a capitalist economy and the survival of the supposedly 
"fittest" firms. This is a case of the borrowing back of an analogy which Darwinian theory 
originally took over from economics. But again the selection environment which confronts 
firms in their competitive struggle is actually very different From the natural environment 
confronting animals and plants and this economic environment is itself rapidly changing in 
ways which are unique. Finally, the political system and the cultural milieu are again uniquely 
human and powerfirlly influence the evolution of the economy, as they also reciprocally 
influence the evolution of science and technology. Evolutionary theories which deal only with 
the survival ofJirm,s (Alchian, 195 1 )  or o~rfy with the survival of artefacts or of nations are 
inadequate for the study of economic growth (Freeman, 1992). 
We have no alternative but to confront the unique features of human history, even though we 
may quite legitimately search for patterns of recurrence and for explanations of recurrence and 
of non-recurrence. One of the most obvious unique features is the rate of knowledge 
accumulation in human societies and the varying modes of disseminating this knowledge 
between individuals and groups. These are rivers which are sufficiently deep and persistent as 
to justif) continuous attention by historians of economic growth, searching both for regular 
patterns as well as for the emergence of new features of flow. The search for recurrent 
patterns should inform the special consideration, which is given to the five historical processes 
which have been identified. 
There are some characteristics of the evolution of human societies which have endured for 
millennia, although their matlfesfarions may have varied very much. Such characteristics 
would be those which primarily distinguish human behaviour from animal behaviour. These 
have been enduring characteristics of all human societies from a very early period of 
differentiation of humans from higher apes and they depend on leart~ing in various ways, so 
that the analysis of changes in the modes of learning should be a central feature in the study of 
economic growth. 
In the earliest times the learning of humans probably closely resembled that of the foraging 
animals from which we are descended. It was essentially a search and observation process 
based on trial and error and the accumulation of knowledge about edible and poisonous, 
potential and actual sources of food. With the domestication of other animals, the use of fire 
and above all with settled agriculture the learning and dissemination became far more 
complex, but still based essentially on search, experiment, language, communication and of 
course serendipity. Contrary to many theories of history it would therefore be possible to date 
the origins of science not in the Middle Ages but in Palaeolithic times or even earlier. What 
has changed is not the search, observation and learning but the modes of conducting and 
organising search, re-search, learning, accumulating, validating and disseminating knowledge 
about the natural world (science) and about ways of producing, using and improving tools and 
artefacts (technology). As the division of labour proceeded within families and tribes and 
varying in different geographical environments, learning about production and exchange 
systems (economics) became increasingly important. As some knowledge became routinised 
in customs and traditions (culture) and in forms of regulating social behaviour (politics, war, 
slavery), so the separate streams of knowledge became increasingly important as well as their 
intermingling in general culture. 
Consequently, the distinction we have made at the outset between the various historical 
processes is not something which emerged only in very recent times, or in the Middle Ages, 
but has been a feature of human history for millennia. What have been changing are the ways 
of learning and accumulating knowledge and passing it on, interacting with changing ways of 
organising production, regulating economic activities and social behaviour. Learning by 
doing, even if it was once mainly learning by gathering and eating, has always been with us. 
Learning by producing and using have been with us since the early use of tools of various 
kinds. Learning by inter-acting has always been with us. These are persistent human activities 
across all civilisations. What have changed are the modes of learning, of recording and 
disseminating what has been learnt and the ways in which different modes of learning have 
interacted with each other. The British industrial revolution was remarkable for these novel 
modes of learning and interacting. 
Another unique but related feature of human evolution is the extent and nature of the division 
of labour in human societies at least for several millennia. It is true that some animal species, 
such as ants and bees also exhibit a fairly complex pattern of social organisation. In the study 
of these animal societies too it is essential to pay close attention to the patterns of 
communication and control, as well as to hierarchical patterns of organisation (Marais, 1975; 
Fabre, 1885). The division of labour in human societies, however, is unique both because of 
its complexity and because of the speed of emergence of new specialisations, associated with 
the rate of knowledge accumulation, the rate and direction of change in techniques and the 
associated changes in the patterns of communication and hierarchical organisation. The 
behavioural routines of colonies of ants and bees have of course evolved over biological time 
but they are so stable that relatively firm predictions can be made, which may be usehl to bee- 
keepers. The behavioural routines which also affect human behaviour are less predictable and 
stable. 
Nevertheless, here too there are some deep and very persistent rivers even though modes of 
navigation may appear to change beyond recognition. We have already argued that the search 
for new knowledge, inventive behaviour in relation to techniques, innovation as well as routine 
behaviour in relation to economic and political organisations are four relatively autonomous 
but persistent streams or historical processes. Analogies with the behaviour of bees or ants 
break down above all because of the role of imagination and changing purpose in these 
activities. As Mam so cogently pointed out: what distinguishes the worst of architects from 
the best of bees is that the architect first of all constructs a building in the imagination. 
The role of imaginative, conscious, purposeful activity is important in all spheres of social life 
and is undoubtedly one of the most important distinctive features of the evolution of human 
societies. There are of course some scientists and theologians who believe that there is a 
purposeful element in the evolution of the universe in general or of this planet or of a chosen 
nation in particular (for example, Gaia theories). Still others believe that the mode of 
evolution is itself sufficient to impart the appearance of purpose without its actual presence 
("blind watchmakers", some versions of chaos theory, etc). Whatever may be the truth in any 
of these theories the element of purpose is overtly present in human history in the conscious 
activities of human beings in a way which is manifestly not the case either in the evolution of 
other animal species or geological evolution. 
Of course, there are some similarities with the animals from which we have evolved, even in 
the purposeful use of tools on a very small scale, or in language, communication and forms of 
social organisation. But at least for the last 5000 years the differences have become so great 
that it would be absurd simply to follow biology (or any other natural science) as a model for a 
theory of human history. 
It is for this reason that we cannot accept Popper's restrictive approach to the purposeful 
action of social groups, as well as individuals. Popper tends to dismiss the effectiveness of 
purposive action by groups of people, maintaining that "groups, nations, classes, societies, 
civilisations, etc." are "very largely postulates of popular social theories rather than empirical 
objects". (Popper, 1963, page 341). He emphasises that "the best laid schemes of mice and 
men gang oft agley" and lead to pain and tears rather than to promised joys. He is very wary 
of "conspiracy theories" which attribute social purpose to entities which can have no such 
collective purpose and formulates "the main task of theoretical social sciences" as to "to trace 
the unintended social repercussions of intentional human actions." (page 342) This type of 
analysis has certainly played an important part in economic theory, especially Keynesian theory 
and it is obviously important in considering the unintended environmental consequences of the 
widespread application of some new technologies. However, sometimes groups do achieve at 
least some of the objectives which they set out to achieve just as individuals do, even if they 
are involved in conflicts. Therefore, historical analysis cannot restrict itself to analysis of 
"unintended consequences" but should also take account of "intended consequences". The 
possibility for individuals to imagine a desirable future and to associate with other individuals 
to achieve a variety of collective purposes, such as catching up in standards of living or 
improving the environment is surely an important difference between human beings and other 
animals and an essential part of the study of economic growth. Certainly this study should 
include unintended as well as intended consequences, as for example, falling behind rather than 
catching up may be the actual outcome of some policies designed to accelerate economic 
growth. But in spite of Popper's well justified aversion to conspiracy theory we cannot rule 
out the study of purposeful actions both by individuals and by groups as well as both their 
intended and their unintended consequences. In this study, comparisons between success and 
failure in achieving intended objectives may be especially fruitful. Even though human beings 
may often not attain the ends which they seek or may even court disaster by persisting with 
conflicting or irreconceivable objectives, or because the outcome of many different purposes 
may be quite different from each taken separately, nevertheless, the role of purposeful activity 
cannot be ignored. Its role is particularly evident in the case of "catching up" to which we 
turn in Section V. 
In this paper it is possible to give only brief illustrative examples and to show only in a very 
condensed form that they are consistent with the stylised facts as they have emerged from 
historical research. In line with the objectives set out in Section I, we shall take these 
examples from the Abramowitz taxonomy of forging ahead,-catching up and falling behind. 
Here, however, we shall concentrate mainly on one example - of forging ahead. We have 
argued that forging ahead is the more difficult phenomenon to explain since although 
intentionality is present in some senses, it cannot be so clear as in the case of catch-up. We 
have therefore given the most attention to the archetypal case for industrial capitalism - the 
British industrial revolution. For catch-up we discuss far more briefly various approaches, 
notably the theories of List, of Gerschenkron and of Perez and Soete (Section V). Even more . 
briefly we mention a few features of British "falling behind" in the 20th Century. 
We have taken these examples from the last two centuries because this is the period in which 
we are most interested and we shall argue that there was a discontinuity in economic growth 
starting with the British industrial revolution. Some generalisations which can be made about 
economic growth after the 18th Century may not be valid before that period. 
The Section which follows discusses the main explanations which have been advanced by 
historians for the British Industrial Revolution. It necessarily contains a certain amount of 
detail in each of a dozen sub-sections. Some fairly extensive quotes are included, especially 
where there are controversial interpretations and where the authors convey a point with 
particular emphasis. Those who are already familiar with the historical literature or who are 
bored with the detail may wish to proceed directly to the summary and analysis in sub-section 
(xii) of Section IV. 
IV. Forging Ahead: the British Industrial Revolution 
Historians (Ashton, 1948; Deane, 1965; Hobsbawm, 1968; Habbakuk, 1963; (Eds) Floud and 
McCloskey, 198 1 ; Rostow, 1960; Mathias, 1969; Landes, 1969; von Tunzelmann, 1978, 
1995; Supple, 1963; (Eds.) Hoppit and Wrigley, 1994) differ in their interpretation of the main 
features of the British industrial revolution. Some put the main emphasis on entrepreneurship, 
some on inventions and innovations, some on transport, communications and trade, and some 
on the growth and composition of market demand. However, almost all agree that single 
factor explanations are inadequate and almost all mention most or all of these together with 
the changes in agriculture and of course the accumulation of capital and mobility of labour. 
The picture which emerges from a dozen or so major studies of the industrial revolution and 
most notably from the recent (1994) eleven-volume history of the industrial revolution 
published by the Economic History Society (Eds. R Church and EA Wrigley) may be 
summarised as follows: 
i) Accelemrio~l of growth from 1780s 
Economic historians appear to agree that there was a fairly sharp acceleration of British 
industrial output, investment and trade in the last two decades of the eighteenth century. 
Hoffmann calculated the rate of growth of British industrial output fiom 1700 to 1780 as 
between half and one per cent per annum, but from 1780 to 1870 at more than 3 per cent. 
More recent estimates (Crafts, 1994) have reduced the estimated growth rates for the later 
period but do not change the hndamental picture (Table I). Supple (1963) sums up the 
consensus as follows: 
"... . . economic change did not experience a steady acceleration, rather there 
was a more or less precise point (which most historians place in the 1780s) 
after which innovation, investment, output, trade and so forth all seemed to 
leap forward ". 
(page 3 5 )  
Although it was the surge of growth in industry in the late 18th Century which was the 
principal component of the acceleration in British economic growth, Phyllis Deane (1962) 
estimated that the rate of growth in national income over the period fiom 1800 to 1860 was 
twice as high as the rate fiom I740 to 1800. Again, new estimates by Crafts (1994) show 
somewhat slower growth for the period 1780-1 800 than some of the earlier estimates. He 
estimates national income growth at 0.7 per cent per annum fiom 1760 to 1780, 1.32 per cent 
from 1780 to 1800 and 1.97 per cent fiom 1801 to 1834 (page 196). However, this did mark 
a transition to a sustained rate of economic growth over a long period greater than any which 
had ever been previously achieved. It is for this reason that the British industrial revolution 
merits intense study, even though the growth rate has since been surpassed. 
Tablc 1. Sectoral Growth of Real Industrial Output (Per Cent oer Annum) in Britain 
Years Cotton Iron Building 
* 1700- 1790 based on 1770 Weights 
1790-1 82 1 based on 180 1 Weights 
Including other industries 
Weighted 
Average* 
0.71 
1.79 
1.60 
2.49 
2.70 
2.42 
Source: Crafts (1 994) 
ii) Excepfioimd growfh nimd fnl1iimgprice.r qf colfoim fexfiles 
The surge of growth in British industry was not simply "balanced reproduction" ("balanced" 
growth of all industries simultaneously) but was characterised by the exceptionally rapid 
growth of a few leading sectors, above all the cotton industry and to a lesser extent, iron 
(Table 1). The share of cotton in total value added of industry grew from 2.6 per cent in 1770 
to 17 per cent in 1801. 
".... in the initial decades of the British industrial revolution it was the cotton 
textile industry which experienced the most spectacular expansion. 
Subsequently, after 1840 railroad investment and the spread of a transportation 
network seemed to dominate the economy and in the third quarter of the 
century, the steel industry and steamship construction leapt ahead" 
(Supple, 1963, page 37). 
The backward and forward linkages to other industries (Hirschman, 1958) were of course also 
important but the exceptional role of the cotton textile industry is generally acknowledged 
both by contemporaries and by historians ever since. Imports of raw cotton grew from an 
average of 16m. Ibs p.a. in 1783-1 787 to 29m. Ibs in 1787-92 and 56m. 1bs in 1800 as the 
source changed from the West Indies to the United States slave plantations. The rate of 
increase in imports was described by a 19th Century historian (Baines, 1835) as "rapid and 
steady far beyond all precedent in any other manufacture". 
He attributed the extraordinary rise in the 1770s and 1780s directly to the effects of technical 
inventions and their diffusion: "from 177 1 to 178 1, owing to the invention of the jenny and the 
water-frame, a rapid increase took place; in the ten years from 178 I to I 79 I, being those 
which immediately followed the invention of the mule and the expiration of Arkwright's 
patent, the rate of advancement was prodigiously accelerated." 
It was on the basis of a whole series of inventions and improvements (Hills, 1994; Mann, 
1958; von Tunzelmann, 1995) that big increases in productivity became possible, based 
increasingly on their exploitation in the new system of factory (mill) based production. These 
improvements in process technology made possible the rapidly falling prices which in turn 
provided the competitive strength for British exports to undercut Indian and other Asian 
textiles and indeed all other producers. Exports of cotton textiles reached 60 per cent of 
output by 1820 and became the biggest single commodity in 19th Century trade accounting 
still for over 30 per cent of British exports of manufactures in 1899, when Britain was still by 
far the biggest exporter. 
Carlota Perez has pointed especially to the role of rapidly falling prices of key production 
factors in successive industrial transformations or long waves of economic development, as 
with steel in the late 19th Century, or oil in the 20th. The most obvious case is of course the 
contemporary orders of magnitude reduction in the price of chips for a myriad of micro- 
electronic devices, and especially for computing. Whilst not quite so spectacular, the fall in 
the price of cotton yarn was certainly remarkable, occurring as it did in the inflationary period 
of the Napoleonic Wars. The price of No. 100 Cotton Yarn fell from 381- in 1786 to 619d in 
1807. Landes (1965) estimates that the price of cotton yarn fell by 1837 to one twentieth of 
its level in 1760 (p. 109). This fall cannot be mainly attributed to a sharp fall in the price of the 
raw material (Table 2), but must be ascribed to innovations. 
iii) Irlve~~tior~ nird Iir~lol~ntioi~ 
Virtually all accounts, whether contemporary or otherwise, agree on the importance of 
inventions, both in the cotton industry and in other industries for the spurt in economic 
growth. Indeed they were often given pride of place in the older textbooks on English history. 
Like Adam Smith (1776) recent studies stress the continuous improvement of processes in the 
factory or work-place, as well as the original major inventions. They also stress the speed 
with which inventions became innovations and were then rapidly diffused. The number of 
patents sealed had been about 80 in the period 1740-49 but increased to over 100 in 1750-59 
and to nearly 300 in 1770-79. Patents are an imperfect indicator but there were no changes in 
this period which might invalidate the series (Eversley, 1994). 




























































